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**Modman** · 10-05-2006, 10:28:05 PM

Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool

Someone who either doubts or denies that there is any such nature as that than which nothing greater can be thought is told that its existence is proved in the following way. First, the very person who denies or entertains doubts about this being has it in his understanding, since when he hears it spoken of he understands what is said. Further, what he understands must exist in reality as well, and not only in the understanding. The argument for this claim goes like this: to exist in reality is greater than to exist only in the understanding. Now if that being exists only in the understanding, then whatever also exists in reality is greater than it. Thus, that which is greater than everything else will be less than something, and not greater than everything else, which is of course a contradiction. And so that which is greater than everything else, which has already been proved to exist in the understanding, must exist not only in the understanding but also in reality, since otherwise it could not be greater than everything else.
He can perhaps reply, “The only reason this is said to exist in my understanding is that I understand what is said. But in the same way, could I not also be said to have in my understanding any number of false things that have no real existence at all in themselves, since if someone were to speak of them I would understand whatever he said? Unless perhaps it is established that this being is such that it cannot be had in thought in the same way that any false or doubtful things can, and so I am not said to think of what I have heard or to have it in my thought, but to understand it and have it in my understanding, since I cannot think of it in any other way except by understanding it, that is, by comprehending in genuine knowledge the fact that it actually exists.
“But first of all, if this were true, there would be no difference in this case between having the thing in the understanding at once time and then later understanding that the thing exists, as there is in the case of a painting, which exists first in the mind of the painter and then in the finished work.
“Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to believe that this being, once someone had heard it spoken of, cannot be thought not to exist, in just the same way that even God can be thought not to exist. For if that were so, why bother with all this argument against someone who denies or doubts that such a nature exists?
“Finally, it must be proved to me by some unassailable argument that this being merely needs to be thought in order for the understanding to perceive with complete certainty that it undoubtedly exists. It is not enough to tell me that it exists in my understanding, since I understand it when I hear about it. I still think I could likewise have any number of other doubtful or even false things in my understanding if I heard them spoken of by someone whose words I understand, and especially if I am so taken in by him that, as often happens, I believe him—as I still do not believe in that being…
“There is a further argument, which I mentioned earlier. When I hear someone speak of that which is greater than everything else that can be thought (which, it is alleged, can be nothing other than God himself), I can no more think of it or have it in my understanding in terms of anything whose genus or species I already know, than I can of God himself—and indeed, for this very reason I can also think of God as not existing. For I do not know the thing itself, and I cannot form an idea of it on the basis of something like it, since you yourself claim that it is so great that nothing else could be like it. Now if I heard something said about a man I do not know at all, whose very existence is unknown to me, I could think of him in accordance with that very thing that a man is, on the basis of that knowledge of genus or species by which I know what a man is or what men are. Nonetheless, it could happen that the one who spoke of this man was lying, and so the man whom I thought of would not exist. But I would still be thinking of him on the basis of a real thing: not what that particular man would be, but what any given man is.
“But when I hear someone speak of ‘God’ or ‘something greater than everything else,’ I cannot have it in my thought or understanding in the same way as this false thing. I was able to think of the false thing on the basis of some real thing that I actually knew. But in the case of God, I can think of him only on the basis of the word. And one can seldom or never think of any truth solely on the basis of a word. And one can seldom or never think of any truth solely on the basis of a word. For in thinking of something solely on the basis of a word, one does not think so much of the word itself (which is at least a real thing: the sound of letters or syllables) as of the meaning of the word that is heard. And in the present case, one does not do this as someone who knows what is customarily meant by the word and thinks of it on the basis of a thing that is real at least in thought. Instead, one thinks of it as someone who does not know the meaning of the word, who thinks only of the impression made on his mind by hearing the word and tries to imagine its meaning. It would be surprising if one ever managed to reach the truth about something in this way. Therefore, when I hear and understand someone saying that there exists something greater than everything else that can be thought, it is in this way, and this way only, that it is present in my understanding. So much, then, for the claim that that supreme nature already exists in my understanding…
“There are those who say that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which, because of the difficulty—or rather, impossibility—of finding what does not exist, some call ‘the Lost Island’. This island (so the story goes) is more plentifully endowed than even the Isles of the Blessed with an indescribable abundance of all sorts of riches and delights. And because it has neither owner nor inhabitant, it is everywhere superior in its abundant riches to all the other lands that human beings inhabit.
“Suppose someone tells me all this. The story is easily told and involves no difficulty, and so I understand it. But if this person went on to draw a conclusion, and say, ‘You cannot any longer doubt that this island, more excellent than all others on earth, truly exists somewhere in reality. For you do not doubt that this island exists in your understanding, and since it is more excellent to exist not merely in the understanding, but also in reality, this island must also exist in reality. For if it did not, any land that exists in reality would be greater than it. And so this more excellent thing that you have understood would not in fact be more excellent’—If, I say, he should try to convince me by this argument that I should no longer doubt whether the island truly exists, either I would think he was joking, or I would not know whom I ought to think more foolish: myself, if I grant him his conclusion, or him, if he thinks he has established the existence of that island with any degree of certainty, without first showing that its excellence exists in my understanding as a thing that truly and undoubtedly exists and not in any way like something false or uncertain.”…

**Modman** · 10-05-2006, 11:07:20 PM

Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo

Since the one who takes me to task is not that fool against whom I was speaking in my book, but a Christian who is no fool, arguing on behalf of the fool, it will be enough for me to reply to the Christian.
You say—whoever you are who say that the fool could say these things—that something than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding no differently form that which cannot even be thought according to the true nature of anything at all. You also say that it does not follow (as I say it does) that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in reality as well simply because it exists in the understanding, any more than it follows that the Lost Island most certainly exists simply because someone who hears it described in words has no doubt that it exists in his understanding. I, however, say this: if that than which a greater cannot be thought is neither understood nor thought, then either God is not that than which a greater cannot be thought, or else he is neither understood nor thought, and exists neither in the understanding nor in thought. I appeal to your own faith and conscience as the most compelling argument that this is false. Therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is indeed understood and thought, and exists in the understanding and in thought. So either the premises by which you attempt to prove the contrary are false, or else what you think follows form them does not in fact follow.
You think that from the fact that something than which a greater cannot be thought is understood, it does not follow that it exists in the understanding; nor does it follow that if it exists in the understanding, it therefore exists in reality. But I say with certainty that if it can be so much as thought to exist, it must necessarily exist. For that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought of as beginning to exist. By contrast, whatever can be thought to exist, but does not in fact exist, can be thought of as beginning to exist. Therefore, it is not the case that that than which a greater cannot be thought to exist, it does necessarily exist.
Furthermore, if it can be thought at all, it necessarily exists. For no one who denies or doubts that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists, denies or doubts that if it did exist, it would be unable to fail to exist either in reality or in the understanding, since otherwise it would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought. But whatever can be thought, but does not in fact exist, could (if it did exist) fail to exist either in reality or in the understanding. So if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought at all, it cannot fail to exist.
But let us assume instead that it does not exist, although it can be thought. Now something that can be thought but does not exist, would not, if it existed, be that than which a greater cannot be thought. And so, if it existed, that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought which is utterly absurd. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought at all, it is false that it does not exist—and much more so if it can be understood and can exist in the understanding.
I shall say something more. If something does not exist everywhere and always, even if perhaps it does exist somewhere and sometimes, it can undoubtedly be thought not to exist anywhere or at any time, just as it does not exist in this particular place or at this particular time. For something that did not exist yesterday but does exist today can be conceived of as never existing in just the same way that it is understood as not existing yesterday. And something that does not exist here but does exist elsewhere can be thought not to exist anywhere in just the same way that it does not exist here. Similarly, when some parts of a thing do not exist in the same place or at the same time as other parts of that thing, all its parts—and therefore the thing as a whole—can be thought not to exist anywhere or at any time. Even if we say that time always exists and that the universe is everywhere, nevertheless, the whole of time does not always exist, and the whole of the universe is not everywhere. And just as some parts of time do not exist when others do, so they can be thought never to exist. And just as some parts of the universe do not exist where others do, so they can be thought to exist nowhere. Moreover, whatever is composed of parts can, at least in thought, be divided and fail to exist. Therefore, whatever does not exist as a whole in all places and at all times, even if it does exist, can be thought not to exist. But that than which a greater cannot be thought, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist. For otherwise, even if it exists, it is not that than which a greater cannot be thought—which is absurd. Therefore, there is no time and no place in which it does not exist as a whole; it exists as a whole always and everywhere.
Do you think the being about whom these things are understood can in any way be thought or understood, or can exist in thought or in the understanding? If it cannot, these claims about it cannot be understood either and does not exist in the understanding because it is not fully understood. But then you would have to say that someone who cannot gaze directly upon the purest light of the sun does not see the light of day, which is nothing other than the light of the sun. Surely that than which a greater cannot be thought is understood, and exists in the understanding, at least to the extent that these things about it are understood….
But, you say, this is just the same as if someone were to claim that it cannot be doubted that a certain island in the ocean, surpassing all other lands in its fertility (which, from the difficulty—or rather, impossibility—of finding what does not exist, is called “the Lost Island”), truly exists in reality, because someone can easily understand it when it is described to him in words. I say quite confidently that if anyone can find for me something existing either in reality or only in thought to which he can apply this inference in my argument, besides that than which a greater cannot be thought, I will find and give to him that Lost Island, never to be lost again. In fact, however, it has already become quite clear that that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought not to exist, since its existence is a matter of such certain truth. For otherwise it would not exist at all.
Finally, if someone says that he thinks it does not exist, I say that when he thinks this, either he is thinking something than which a greater cannot be thought, or he is not. If he is not, then he is not thinking that it does not exist, since he is not thinking it at all. But if he is, he is surely thinking something that cannot be thought not to exist. For if it could be thought not to exist, it could be thought to have a beginning and an end, which is impossible. Therefore, someone who is thinking it, is thinking something that cannot be thought not to exist. And of course someone who is thinking this does not think that that very thing does not exist. Otherwise he would be thinking something that cannot be thought. Therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought not to exist…
Now as for the other objections you raise against me on behalf of the fool, anyone with much sense at all can easily see through them, so I had judged it best not to bother proving this. But since I hear that some readers think they have some force against me, I will deal with them briefly. First, you repeatedly say that I argue that that which is greater than everything else exists in the understanding; and that if it exists in the understanding, it also exists in reality, for otherwise that which is greater than everything else would not be greater than everything else. Nowhere in anything I said can such an argument be found. For “that which is greater than everything else” and “that than which a greater cannot be thought” do not have the same force in proving that the thing spoken of exists in reality. For if someone says that that than which a greater cannot be thought is not something existing in reality, or is capable of not existing, or can be thought not to exist, he is easily refuted…
This does not seem to be so easily proved with regard to what is said to be greater than everything else. For it is not as evident that something that can be thought not to exist is not that which is greater than everything else that exists, as it is that such a thing is not that than which a greater cannot be thought. Nor is it indubitable that if there is something greater than everything else, it is the same as that than which a greater cannot be thought, or that if such a thing were to exist, there would not exist another thing just like it. But these things are certainly true of what is called “that than which a greater cannot be thought.” For what if someone were to say that something exists that is greater than everything else that exists, and yet that this very thing can be thought not to exist, and that something greater than it can be thought, although that greater thing does not actually exist? Can it be just as easily inferred in this case that it is not greater than everything else that exists, as it was perfectly certain in the previous case that it was not that than which a greater cannot be thought? In the second case we would need another premise, besides the mere fact that this being is said to be “greater than everything else,” whereas in the first case there was no need for anything more than the expression “That than which a greater cannot be thought.” Therefore, since “that than which a greater cannot be thought” proves things about itself and through itself that cannot be proved in the same way about what is said to be “greater than everything else,” you have unjustly criticized me for saying things I did not say, when they differ greatly form what I actually said….
Again, you say that when you hear “that than which a greater cannot be thought,” you cannot think it in accordance with some thing that you know by genus or species, or have it in your understanding, since you do not know the thing itself and cannot infer it on the basis of something similar. But that is clearly wrong. For since every lesser good, insofar as it is good, is similar to a greater good, it is clear to every reasonable mind that by raising our thoughts from lesser goods to greater goods, we can infer a great deal about that than which a greater cannot be thought on the basis of those things than which a greater can be thought. Who, for example, is unable to think (even if he does not believe that what he thinks exists in reality) that if something that has a beginning and end is better still, even if it is always moving from the past through the present into the future? And that something that in no way needs or is compelled to change or move is far better even that that, whether any such thing exists in reality or not? Can such a thing not be thought? Can anything greater than this be thought? Or rather, is not this an example of inferring that than which a greater cannot be thought on the basis of those things than which a greater can be thought? So there is in fact a way to infer that than which a greater cannot be thought. And so in this way it is easy to refute a fool who does not accept the scared authority, if he denies that one can infer that than which a greater cannot be thought on the basis of other things. But if an orthodox Christina were to deny this, he should recall that “since the creation of the world the invisible things of God—his everlasting power and divinity—have been clearly seen through the things that have been made” (Romans 1:20)….
I believe I have now shown that my proof in the foregoing book that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in reality was no weak argument, but a quite conclusive one, one that is not weakened by the force of any objection. For the meaning of this expression has such great force that, form the mere fact that it is understood or thought, what is said is necessarily proved both to exist in reality and to be whatever we ought to believe about the divine nature. Now we believe about the divine nature everything that can be thought, absolutely speaking, better for something to be than not to be. For example, it is better to be eternal than not eternal, good than not good, and indeed goodness itself, rather than not goodness itself. That than which something greater cannot be thought cannot fail to be anything of this sort. So one must believe that that than which a greater cannot be thought is whatever we ought to believe about the divine nature….

**Modman** · 10-06-2006, 12:14:41 AM

So far, my only retort is that God is not only that to which nothing is greater, but also that to which nothing equals. And by nothing, I mean nothing, as does every other christian. Therefore, we cannot have an idea and/or concept that equals God, such as a complete understanding of him. Therefore, God cannot exist in our understanding, and the entire base of Anselm's argument is destroyed.

**Lazy Bastard** · 10-06-2006, 10:15:16 AM

I'm at work, so this will probably be sporadic...

...for without a God, there is no valid religion.

There are some religions that do not include a god...for example, religions similar to the Final Fantasy VII Lifestream concept. The Lifestream could be construed as a god in this example, but there are some that would be a little more difficult to assign the title to something in.

Therefore, Lord, you who grant understanding to faith, grant that, insofar as you know it is useful for me, I may understand that you exist as we believe you exist, and that you are what we believe you to be.

A humorous request, as God obviously has no intention of helping anyone understand or believe in him...he certainly wouldn't help someone prove his existence, as his abstinence from revealing himself to us is an indication that he does not want to be absolutely known. Christians claim he wants us to decide for ourselves, therefore he could never reveal himself - then we'd know, and there wouldn't be such a decision.

But when the same fool hears me say “something than which nothing greater can be thought,” he surely understands what he hears; and what he understands exists in his understanding, even if he does not understand that it exists [in reality]. For it is one thing for an object to exist in the understanding and quite another to understand that the object exists [in reality]. When a painter, for example, thinks out in advance what he is going to paint, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand that it exists, since he has not yet painted it. So even the fool must admit that something than which nothing greater can be thought exists at least in his understanding, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood exists in the understanding. And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist only in the understanding. For if it exists only in the understanding, then that than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But that is clearly impossible. Therefore, there is no doubt that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the understanding and in reality.

This argument is laughable. He attests that, since one can comprehend the concept of a being that is greater than all other beings (which, by the way, isn't necessarily true, as the definition of "greater" is a bit ambiguous), and a real being would be greater than an imaginary one, there must be a real being that is the greatest being that could exist (or be conceived of, in any case). He seems to imply that this would be the Christian God as well (his references to the Christian Bible further indicate this).

When one imagines things, one imagines them existing. If I were to think of a friend of mine who exists, I would imagine him as existing; I'd do the same were I imagining God. An imaginary God is just as powerful as a real God, in someone's mind. Since God isn't sitting here for this conversation, we're imagining him, whether he exists or not. Moreover, if I imagined the most powerful electric toothbrush conceivable, which had its own consciousness and could melt planets at will, and the most powerful one would have to be one that existed, than it still would not really exist (well, it could, but it isn't very likely).

Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate that one could not think God does not exist. Anselm explains that one could say, or think the words, "God does not exist", but to truly think something is to truly understand it, and since that statement cannot be understood (apparently because it's not true, as "proven" by the previous arguments), one could not think as such. Not only does this all hinge on the above statements being true, but it's also a bit odd itself.

You see, one can neither understand the existence of God nor the lack of "his" existence. We can't even think of a good way to understand existence itself yet. As humans, it seems as if we may never comprehend a beginning of time, nor another way of thinking of time to forego the need for understanding a beginning. In any case, as we cannot truly understand God either, this argument should be discarded.

Chapter 5: That God is whatever it is better to be than not to be; and that he alone exists through himself, and makes all other things from nothing

Then what are you, Lord God, than which nothing greater can be thought? What are you, if not the greatest of all beings, who alone exists through himself and made all other things from nothing? For whatever is not this is less than the greatest that can be thought, but this cannot be thought of you. What good is missing from the supreme good, through which every good thing exists? And so you are just, truthful, happy, and whatever it is better to be than not to be. For it is better to be just than unjust, and better to be happy than unhappy.

This begins to sound like it's being preached. He attests that, since we've established that God exists and is the greatest being ever (which we haven't), he must also be the other two main things the Bible claims he is: supremely just and supremely wise. He doesn't give any strong logic to support the proposition that it is better to be just than unjust, and better to be happy than unhappy. The latter would seem to be evident in our own respective (human) existences, though even that could be debunked simply by proposing that when one is unhappy, he attempts to do something to change this, and is thus accomplishing, or at least endeavoring to accomplish, something more than just sitting around, content. One could argue that a person might still accomplish things while happy, but one would counter by saying that if one were supremely happy (as God would apparently be expected to be), one would only continue to do that which was keeping him happy, to perpetuate such happiness (even helping others, in deference to one's own happiness, would be avoiding unhappiness, if one were a good being with such inclinations), and would not do something that would make him the slightest bit less happy, as that would contradict the concept of supreme happiness. The opposition would then claim that all of God's work makes him supremely happy, or that no matter what God does, he is always happy, so it doesn't matter what he does. In any case, God has been sad in the Bible before. An example is when he apparently annihilated most of the human population with a great deluge (the Noah's Ark event). To be supremely happy and even slightly sad is a contradiction, unless one uses the "God is great; God can do anything, and it doesn't matter if you understand it or not" argument, heh.

As I'm at work, I'll read and reply to the rest later on.

**Modman** · 10-06-2006, 11:02:09 AM

Originally posted by Parasyte

OK, I give up. I stopped reading the second reply at the point of his circular arguments. (Why is it that all religious debates boil down to self-reliant circularity?) Saying that God exists just because someone thought of it previously is the most chaotic, imbecilic idea ever. Comparatively, I am currently thinking of my OWN God, having nothing in common with the Christian God, which has just brought my God into existence by the mere understanding of what it is. Now that my God exists, you cannot deny it exists, due to the begging of existence I have just displayed before you.

The only way to defeat such circular arguments is to scratch the argument completely. You cannot remove the aspect that the existence of understanding is existence without also removing the aspect that "existence" is used in such an ambigious way (understanding == reality, understanding != reality, understanding < reality...) To that effect, the structure of the argument is founded upon itself, and is therefore entirely illogical, in that it holds no basis in logic whatsoever.

If anything, these circular arguments are an anomaly that most defenders of the existence of God rely upon without understanding the problem of circular arguments, and that stripping them completely is the only solution to such problems. Hence, putting it bluntly, getting rid of God solves the problem of God's impossible existence.

Furthermore, going back to the original claims, "No one who understands what God is can think that God does not exist, although he may say these words in his heart with no signification at all, or with some peculiar signification." This is the most preposterous sentence I have ever read. He is trying to say, "the idea of God = the idea of the pinnacle of everything" and that understanding this point, one could not imagine that a pinnacle does not exist. However, we have words to describe this very point: infinity, for example. Utopia for another. There are many ideas that discredit this way of thinking. And in doing so, catharsis comes in the form of understanding that "the most perfect, greatest thing imaginable" is superseded by the simple idea of infiniteness, which is ironically and humorously often portrayed as God Himself.

On the opposite side of the debate, arguing that God is akin to an island is a bit ridiculous, but so is the anology. Almost anyone fully comprehends what an island is. Going by Gaunilo's own previous point of debate, the thought of the perfect island is based upon islands known to exist, probably even through first-hand experience. Therefore this point of argument collapses in on itself and no longer holds any meaning.

Now that I've run myself into a deadend, I think it's obvious that such topics of debate are certainly pointless; God doesn't make you a better person, God doesn't fill your life with happiness, God doesn't do anything relevant to your being; you do. There is no God in the sense that someone or something smites me for not going to church, or for masturbating to pornagraphic images. There is a God in the sense that certain physical phenomena keep my feet on the ground, and at the same time, keep my feet from going through the ground. There is a God in the sense that reality is in all forms a cosmic singularity that can be explained by very simple laws. (Getting a bit off topic now ~) Religion just takes this idea of God and stretches it to fit its own agenda. And that, my friends, is where the debate of the existence of God comes into focus.

P.S. Agnosticism is the way to go.

[Edit: I hate Remote Desktop Connection. It copies invalid characters (null terminators, probably) into the OS X pasteboard that browsers (or perhaps the server/phpBB) cannot handle. So the remainder of text is simply truncated. This has now been remedied.]

This is what Parasyte has had to say so far. Very appreciative, I'll be sure to mention you guys should I quote anything in my own argument.

I'm about to go find my professor and see what he has to say about my own argument. I will let you guys know what he says.

**Lazy Bastard** · 10-06-2006, 11:18:04 AM

Now if I heard something said about a man I do not know at all, whose very existence is unknown to me, I could think of him in accordance with that very thing that a man is, on the basis of that knowledge of genus or species by which I know what a man is or what men are. Nonetheless, it could happen that the one who spoke of this man was lying, and so the man whom I thought of would not exist. But I would still be thinking of him on the basis of a real thing: not what that particular man would be, but what any given man is.

Yes.

Suppose someone tells me all this. The story is easily told and involves no difficulty, and so I understand it. But if this person went on to draw a conclusion, and say, ‘You cannot any longer doubt that this island, more excellent than all others on earth, truly exists somewhere in reality. For you do not doubt that this island exists in your understanding, and since it is more excellent to exist not merely in the understanding, but also in reality, this island must also exist in reality. For if it did not, any land that exists in reality would be greater than it. And so this more excellent thing that you have understood would not in fact be more excellent’—If, I say, he should try to convince me by this argument that I should no longer doubt whether the island truly exists, either I would think he was joking, or I would not know whom I ought to think more foolish: myself, if I grant him his conclusion, or him, if he thinks he has established the existence of that island with any degree of certainty, without first showing that its excellence exists in my understanding as a thing that truly and undoubtedly exists and not in any way like something false or uncertain.

Perhaps a better analogy than my electric toothbrush one, though I still prefer mine for the absurdity of it, heh.

I, however, say this: if that than which a greater cannot be thought is neither understood nor thought, then either God is not that than which a greater cannot be thought, or else he is neither understood nor thought, and exists neither in the understanding nor in thought. I appeal to your own faith and conscience as the most compelling argument that this is false.

By Anselm's definition of understanding and thought, God really doesn't exist within these. The last sentence here doesn't belong in logical debate, but in a church. Its parallel would be, "What kind of person are you if you don't believe?"

But I say with certainty that if it can be so much as thought to exist, it must necessarily exist. For that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought of as beginning to exist. By contrast, whatever can be thought to exist, but does not in fact exist, can be thought of as beginning to exist. Therefore, it is not the case that that than which a greater cannot be thought to exist, it does necessarily exist.

Not only did he mix up his negatives in the last sentence, but this entire statement is ridiculous. He's stating here that anything you can imagine must exist.

Furthermore, if it can be thought at all, it necessarily exists. For no one who denies or doubts that something than which a greater cannot be thought exists, denies or doubts that if it did exist, it would be unable to fail to exist either in reality or in the understanding, since otherwise it would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought. But whatever can be thought, but does not in fact exist, could (if it did exist) fail to exist either in reality or in the understanding. So if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought at all, it cannot fail to exist.

That's extraneous. He's repeating himself, and seems to be trying to muddy the waters with more verbage.

But let us assume instead that it does not exist, although it can be thought. Now something that can be thought but does not exist, would not, if it existed, be that than which a greater cannot be thought. And so, if it existed, that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought which is utterly absurd. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought at all, it is false that it does not exist—and much more so if it can be understood and can exist in the understanding.

Again, he's simply repeating himself, and again, the concept of imagining something and thinking of something one knows to exist comes into question. What's "utterly absurd" is that he somehow extrapolates this into a logical mandate that God must exist.

But that than which a greater cannot be thought, if it exists, cannot be thought not to exist. For otherwise, even if it exists, it is not that than which a greater cannot be thought—which is absurd. Therefore, there is no time and no place in which it does not exist as a whole; it exists as a whole always and everywhere.

He'd be correct, if God was proven to exist, or if we could at least comprehend the existence, or lack thereof, of God. He's skipping steps here, and using the skipped steps as proof that the final ones are true.

But then you would have to say that someone who cannot gaze directly upon the purest light of the sun does not see the light of day, which is nothing other than the light of the sun.

This would be the same as saying that because God control everything, and the earth rotates, we know God exists because we know the earth rotates, which happens because God makes it so.

I say quite confidently that if anyone can find for me something existing either in reality or only in thought to which he can apply this inference in my argument, besides that than which a greater cannot be thought, I will find and give to him that Lost Island, never to be lost again. In fact, however, it has already become quite clear that that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought not to exist, since its existence is a matter of such certain truth. For otherwise it would not exist at all.

Pompous arrogance, perhaps intended to impress the reader and make him/her laugh. What makes me laugh about this is that he's saying "that than which there can be no greater" is the only thing one can fully imagine in one's mind that one doesn't know the existence of by experience. Therefore, I could not understand or conceive with full understanding a box made entirely of gold, one thousand feet tall by one thousand feet wide by one thousand feet deep, as I haven't experienced it yet, and it doesn't exist. But I can, and Anselm owes me an island.

Geh, back to work...I'll continue later.

**Modman** · 10-06-2006, 11:47:47 AM

Bah, I had to email my prof because he's not in today. Here is the email, would you please review it and tell me if I'm missing any important steps to proving my points? I'd greatly appreciate it.

Originally posted by Modman

God is not simply that than which there is nothing greater, He is also that than
which there is nothing equal. This is known by definition. Therefore, by that
proof, it would be a contradiction to have an equal idea and/or concept of God
in your understanding to the "true" God himself. Ideas and/or concepts are not
nothing, therefore they cannot equal God. Therefore, one cannot truly have God
exist in their understanding (by anselm's definition), and therefore whatever
idea and/or concept they have in their understanding which they consider to be
God is actually something else, because it cannot be God by definition.
Therefore, one cannot postulate that God exists in reality because he exists
through idea and/or concept in one's understanding.

The only other thing I see wrong with anselm's argument is that he is attempting
to place God in a finite frame of reference. "That than which there is nothing
greater" attempts to fixate God at the very top of everything, however we are
already familiar with the term Infinity, and if God is finite, then infinity is
greater than him, and this cannot be true by Anselm's definition. Therefore God
must be greater than infinity, and this is a contradiction in itself. For since
there can be nothing that than which God is equal, God cannot be equal to
infinity, and in order to satisfy Anselm's definition of God, he must
necessarily be greater than infinity.

If I am wrong in any way, please let me know. Thanks, and see you in class on
Tuesday.

**Lazy Bastard** · 10-06-2006, 01:23:43 PM

That's decently put, I guess. There were other points you could have attacked, but I suppose you were trying to be concise, which you accomplished satisfactory (well...to me).

The only problem with arguing that God is not as great as infinity is that infinity is an intangible noun. It's not much different than saying, "God can't be greater than jealousy". Still, I disagree with Anselm, and you can see fairly easily that he doesn't even agree with himself. Near the end, he begins to crumble at the edges, and invokes our faith and conscience, as well as repeating himself with very little additional thought into the matter. Quoting a (prose) poem I published through, and by request of, London's "Noble House Books" a few years ago,

[...]
For as fast as I search for the truth,
I'm always a step ahead of myself,
Burying it.
[...]

**Lazy Bastard** · 10-06-2006, 02:19:39 PM

And so in this way it is easy to refute a fool who does not accept the scared authority

Anselm made a typo, and a really funny one at that.

But if an orthodox Christina were to deny this

And there's another. Unless you're typing these from a book...either way, it's humorous, heh.

So one must believe that that than which a greater cannot be thought is whatever we ought to believe about the divine nature….

Yes, if there was such a being.

**Modman** · 10-06-2006, 10:48:27 PM

Yeah, lol, I transcribed from a book at about 85 words per minute, then used spell check. Heh.

And, intangible noun or not, the argument is that nothing is greater than or equal to God. If you were to go so far as to say that God equaled infinity, then that opens up a very nice door for us to postulate what other things could also equal God, and by having an equal, God cannot be The Greatest.

**Lazy Bastard** · 10-06-2006, 11:14:19 PM

Yes, but just as infinity is not a specific thing, neither can be "the greatest". If we were to postulate that God is "the greatest", then we would be saying God = "the greatest". By your argument, God can't equal the greatest and be the greatest at the same time, because he would have an equal, which would be "the greatest". Infinity isn't a specific thing, therefore the Christians may argue that God really IS infinity; that he is everything, and always.

**Lazy Bastard** · 10-06-2006, 11:20:13 PM

Here's the unrelated drivel I mentioned in chat:
_____________________________

For the sake of simplicity, I'll call the entity we call "God" a He. Sorry, heh.

If an omnipotent being was at one point all by himself in an empty universe (unless we are to understand that he created the universe as well - "...created the heavens and the earth..." - but I don't think that's what "heavens" are supposed to be interpreted as), what force would drive him to make life? Why would he create some (and I'm speaking of individuals here) people, or animals, whose lives will be horrible in ways far outweighing the good parts? Yes, we're assuming they'll go to heaven soon after (if they're deserving, which is another issue altogether that we'll talk about later), but unless God doesn't actually know what's going to happen in everyone's entire life, why doesn't he just skip the miserable life, and send them straight to heaven? But then again, if he knows everything that's ever going to happen, he must already know who is and isn't going to believe in him, and who is and isn't going to "deserve" hell by this and other "sins". So even a theologian would have to agree that God can't see everything that will ever happen (or perhaps purposefully avoids seeing, so as not to...spoil the fun?); I'm assuming the next argument of said theologian is that God has given us free will, which he cannot predict (which would both have to be the argument, and be incredibly loose since him not predicting the results of free will basically means he has no idea what's going to happen next on the entire planet), in an effort to see which of us will accept him as an existing being, and thus be good people. So essentially, when there was nothing at all in an empty void, he created a host of beings and a place for them to live, so he could see if the beings, which he created and which would have all the flaws and all the becoming qualities he bestowed upon them, would be good or not, and would be skeptics or not. Accepting that it's almost inevitably, indefinitely a rhetorical question, I've still got to ask...why?

Was it a charitable act? Did he decide to spiritually spawn us all so that we'd have the pleasure, overall, of all the various facets of existence? Is it just to enjoy the wonder of life that we're "here"? Or is it, as many Christians seem to think, only to worship him? And what would be the point of such an existence...his entertainment, or...to boost his self-esteem...or perhaps to serve him by carrying out certain tasks? So, in allegory to a kingdom, we've come up with three possible occupations for all sentient beings: jesters, minstrels, and peasants. Again, and now further, why? And what tasks could we carry out that he could not more easily himself? And for what purpose would we be carrying out such tasks, when he created everything - why wouldn't he simply create everything exactly as he wanted it in the first place?

And back to deserving...and this will be very digressive, I'm sure...those who deserve get to enter heaven. Perhaps, in answer to the microcosmic question of why he wants us to be good and believe in him, he's simply experimenting with different configurations of the soul, molding the proletariat of Heaven in an image that pleases him, and not particularly in an altruistically "good" one. In any other instance, why would he care whether we have the quality of a person that would believe in something with absolutely no guide toward such a belief but that the majority of others believe, and the constant, ever-continuous (or neverending, heh) cycle of parent teaching child from birth? We also make our children believe in Santa Claus.

**Modman** · 10-08-2006, 07:45:54 PM

Glad to learn that you are thinking about the material outside of class. The
topic certainly merits hard thinking. Your idea that we cannot have God in the
understanding is a topic worth pursuing (perhaps you might do so in the first
paper assignment, which comes out Tuesday). One question about your perspective
is whether the idea of thinking of something equivalent to God is already
encompassed in Anselm's definition of God as that than which nothing greater
can be thought. If we construe this to mean the "greatest conceivable thing"
then, by definition, there cannot be anything equivalent to it, right, since it
can only apply to "one" object. Still, attacking the idea that we can even have
this idea is a worthwhile strategy...not that Gaunilo raises this issue when he
asks Anselm where such an idea could even come from (see the text at page 22,
last paragraph). Another thought of yours seems to be that God can't be the
same as the concept "God", and so we can't really have the idea of God in our
understanding. This suggestion, though, rests on a confusion between a concept
and the thing it refers to. All that Anselm means when he says we have the idea
of God is that we possess the concept and know what it refers to. Anyone who
knows this has the idea of God in his/her understanding, just as anyone who
knows that concept "cat" and what it refers to (four legged, furry animal,
etc.) has that idea in his understanding.

**Modman** · 10-17-2006, 02:22:29 AM

Arguments against the Ontological Argument
In this paper, I will question the plausibility of the existence of God as described by Anselm in his argument, which I have read and studied to prepare for this critique. Anselm argues that God is “that than which there is nothing greater,” as well as “that which it is better to be than not to be.” My argument is that these statements place the God which Anselm postulates to exist in reality in two categories to which he cannot both belong for these statements to be true, and that for these statements to be true, the God of Anselm must belong to all categories which are greater or better to be a part of than not to be. There is a way that Anselm may have countered my argument.
First I will define two categories of existence. When something that exists is tangible, it is something that can be touched, can be easily defined, grasped, or formulated, and has substance. When something that exists is intangible, it is something that cannot be touched, cannot be easily defined, grasped, or formulated, and is without material body or substance.
Anselm defines God as that than which there is nothing greater, as well as whatever it is better to be than not to be. At first glance, these definitions appear to be completely compatible. That is, until we examine them a bit more deeply. Anselm’s logic appears to be flawed because, by human logic, it is greater to be intangible than tangible yet better to be tangible than intangible, but, by Anselm’s definition, it must also be better to be intangible than tangible as this is the greater and God is both greater and better. It is greater to be intangible because it represents a more complex concept; something that exists in a higher state of being than physical. It is better, by human logic, to be tangible because it is something one can know to exist and can work with physically to understand it. Anselm has implied that God is a tangible being, as God is easily defined as that than which there is nothing greater, could be touched if He so desired to be (omnipotent), is easily grasped due to the fact that the concept of that than which there is nothing greater is a relatively easy concept for me to grasp, and must have substance since it is greater than not to have substance. Clearly God cannot both be intangible and tangible at the same time, yet by Anselm’s definitions of God, he cannot also be either intangible or tangible as the former is greater than the latter, yet the latter is better than the former.
Anselm may have countered this by saying that when he applied the concept of better to God, he meant what would be strictly better for God to be, rather than what would be better for us for God to be in which case it might be possible for intangible to be better than tangible. However, I would counter this with the fact that all of the examples Anselm lists do not strictly fall under the category of that which would be strictly better for God but rather all fall under the category of that which would be better for us to be better for God. That fact leads me to conclude that Anselm was not in fact talking about that which would be strictly better for God because in both cases there exists things that are better than not to be..
In this paper I have argued that God cannot both be that than which there is nothing greater as well as that which it is better than not to be and that that conclusion is not compatible with Anselm’s argument. I have, however, countered myself with a reply that Anselm might have given which states that perhaps he was not defining better as that which would be better for us to be better for God. This strategy for dodging my argument is a good one, as my final counter relies on probability and not fact.

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